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Symposium
THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHMOOZE
FOREWORD: MAKING SENSE OF AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
CONSTITUTION IN A TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORLD
MARK A. GRABER*
Prominent constitutional originalists and historians of political
thought when examining political texts often employ the same methods for very different reasons. Both seek to understand political language as that language was understood when uttered. Randy Barnett,
a leading constitutional theorist, insists that “the words of the Constitution should be interpreted according to the meaning they had at
the time they were enacted.”1 Quentin Skinner, the founder of the
influential Cambridge School in political philosophy, wholeheartedly
agrees with this method of analysis: “The essential question which we
therefore confront, in studying any given text,” he writes, “is what its
author, in writing at the time he did write for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been intending to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance.”2 Nevertheless,
constitutional originalists and Cambridge School political philosoCopyright  2007 by Mark A Graber.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Professor of Government,
University of Maryland, College Park. Much thanks to all the contributors and to the Maryland Law Review for making this Symposium possible.
1. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 89 (2004).
2. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in MEANING &
CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 63 (James Tully ed., 1988). The above passage, read out of context, might suggest an original understanding rather than an original
meaning approach to textual analysis. Skinner, however, maintains that original meaning
analysis is typically the best way of realizing original understanding. See id. at 64.
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phers have quite disparate motives for studying original meaning.
Barnett and many other legal thinkers insist that Americans in 2007
should be legally bound by the original meaning of constitutional provisions. “[O]riginalism is warranted,” Barnett states, “because it is the
best method to preserve or ‘lock in’ a constitution that is initially legitimate because of what it says.”3 Skinner claims that Americans in 2007
cannot be legally bound by the original meaning of constitutional provisions: “Whenever it is claimed that the point of the historical
study . . . is that we may learn directly from the answers,” he bluntly
states, “it will be found that what counts as an answer will usually look,
in a different culture or period, so different in itself that it can hardly
be in the least useful even to go on thinking of the relevant question
as being ‘the same’ in the required sense at all.”4
The 2007 Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze5 provides a forum for exploring this tension between these contrasting approaches
to the value of constitutional originalism. Much discussion focused
on the enormously influential recent works of Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, regular Schmooze participants. Although good friends
and ongoing collaborators,6 Balkin and Levinson have taken positions
on opposite sides of the originalist divide between Barnett and Skinner. Balkin has recently announced his conversion to originalism:
“Constitutional interpretation,” he now states, “requires fidelity to the
original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text.”7 Levinson has experienced a more Skinnerian conversion. He finds continued recourse to an eighteenth-century text for
governing a twenty-first-century polity absurd: “the Constitution,” Levinson asserts, “is both insufficiently democratic, in a country that professes to believe in democracy, and significantly dysfunctional, in
terms of the quality of government that we receive.”8
The following Essays on An Eighteenth-Century Constitution in a
Twenty-First-Century World explore the interpretive and political challenges inherent in recourse to an ancient text for resolving political
3. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 89.
4. Skinner, supra note 2, at 66.
5. For details on the Schmooze, see Mark A. Graber, Foreword: From the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to Juristocracy and the Political Construction of Judicial Power, 65 MD. L. REV. 1, 4
(2006).
6. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006).
7. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming
2007); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
(forthcoming 2007).
8. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 9 (2006).
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questions. Although no Essay cites Quentin Skinner,9 the debates between participants in the Schmooze and this Symposium mirror the
debates between Skinner and his critics.10 Some participants insist
that crucial aspects of an eighteenth-century text remain vibrant at
present, that contemporary political life would be improved by more
careful study of the Constitution. Bradley Hays’s study of state interposition in the early-nineteenth century takes the Barnett/Balkin position that “contemporary problems are likely not wholly new and that
past generations fought similar constitutional battles.” In his view,
framing “innovations are useful resources for contemporary constitutional problems.”11 Others blame crucial pathologies of American
politics on a combination of too careful study of and too uncritical
veneration for the constitutional text. Surveying the pathologies of
single-membered districts in a time of political polarization, Carol
Nackenoff concludes, “there are surely ways we could form a better
plan of union for a twenty-first-century nation.”12
Concerns with whether “constitutionalism” presently has the
same meaning or commitments as in past centuries are at the heart of
many Essays that follow. George Thomas insists that the “elements of
eighteenth-century constitutionalism that our Constitution embraces . . . should be foundational to any new form of government we
create in the twenty-first century.”13 Thomas most forcefully insists
that any new constitutionalism respect the inherited constitutional
“insistence on substantive limits to governmental power.”14 Peter
Quint points out that contemporary constitutions are often more concerned with empowering government to do well than disempowering
them to violate fundamental rights. In sharp contrast to constitutions
drafted in the eighteenth century, constitutions drafted in the twentieth century “impose obligations of social welfare, education, and
9. But see Pamela Brandwein, The Civil Rights Cases and the Lost Language of State Neglect, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 278 (Ronald Kahn &
Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 219 (1980) (citing Skinner in support of claims that original meanings
cannot be fully recovered).
10. For a flavor of those debates, see Skinner, supra note 2, at 135–288.
11. Bradley D. Hays, A Place for Interposition? What John Taylor of Caroline and the Embargo
Crisis have to Offer Regarding Resistance to the Bush Administration, 67 MD. L. REV. 200, 221
(2007).
12. Carol Nackenoff, Constitutional Reforms to Enhance Democratic Participation and Deliberation: Not All Clearly Trigger the Article V Amendment Process, 67 MD. L. REV. 62, 84 (2007).
13. George Thomas, Two Cheers for Eighteenth-Century Constitutionalism in the Twenty-First
Century, 67 MD. L. REV. 222, 224 (2007).
14. Id. at 230.
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other services on government.”15 Twenty-first-century constitutions,
Quint observes, announce such “third-generation rights” as rights to a
safe environment, international peace, and cultural integrity.16 Given
these differences in constitutional purposes, Skinnerian questions
may be raised about whether the word “constitutionalism” is even
describing the same political phenomenon when used in the eighteenth and twenty-first centuries.17
A new constitutionalism may require innovative constitutional
thinking and fundamental constitutional transformations. Joe Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlich insist that persons who share the
contemporary constitutional commitment to social welfare must develop a new metric for measuring social welfare, one that “focus[es]
on needs as a foundational aspect of social welfare.”18 Constitutional
regimes at present are likely to meet these contemporary standards,
they assert, only by institutional adjustments that reduce “the checks
and balances against democracy” that “prevent some democratic systems from delivering better policies (i.e., those that could ensure
higher welfare) to their citizenry.”19 Paradoxically this greater attention to inequality may inspire greater appreciation of the framing vision. Yasmin Dawood points out that more so than many twenty-firstcentury constitutionalists, Madison and others regarded “the task of
constitutional design” as “neutraliz[ing] the potentially devastating
political effects of the wealth divide by institutional means.”20 While
the persons responsible for the Constitution of 1789 believed that economic equality was undesirable and would violate property rights,
Dawood points out that the Framers were far more willing than many
contemporary Americans to acknowledge how “the ‘distinction of rich
& poor’” threatened “the very survival of republican government
itself.”21
Other Essays examine the value of specific eighteenth-century
principles in a twenty-first-century world. Kenneth Ward suggests that
separation of powers may be fatally weakening the constitutional re15. Peter E. Quint, What is a Twentieth-Century Constitution?, 67 MD. L. REV. 238, 240
(2007).
16. Id. at 243.
17. See Skinner, supra note 2, at 50 (noting how “the literal meaning of key terms sometimes change over time”).
18. Joe Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlich, Demystifying Social Welfare: Foundations for
Constitutional Design, 67 MD. L. REV. 85, 87 (2007).
19. Id. at 113 (emphasis omitted).
20. Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of Wealth,
67 MD. L. REV. 123, 126 (2007).
21. Id. at 127–28.
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public. His examination of post-September 11 political debates concludes that “the constitutional system of checks and balances distorts
democratic deliberation about issues of national security by integrating questions of security within a broader political agenda.”22 The rise
of political parties combined with too sharp a separation of governing
institutions, in his view, provides incentives for government officials to
promote partisan causes rather than intelligent security policy when
debating measures for combating terrorism.23 Both Frances Lee and
Carol Nackenoff raise questions about whether an eighteenth-century
scheme of representation generates representative institutions capable of responding to twenty-first-century problems and satisfying
twenty-first-century interests. The “[g]eographic constitutuencies
mandated by the Constitution of the United States,” Lee complains,
“hearken back to a time of small, isolated, rural communities where
communication and travel were difficult.”24 She details how maintaining such representation at present “makes parochialism normative for
members of Congress.”25 Nackenoff blames the constitutional failure
to mandate proportional representation for the contemporary “party
polarization in Congress.”26 This polarization is to blame for the “legislative gridlock” that “reduces [Congress’s] output of significant (as
opposed to trivial and narrow) legislation.”27 Hays, by comparison,
thinks that greater appreciation of eighteenth-century federalism
might provide some constitutional tonic at the dawn of the twenty-first
century. “State-driven constitutionalism” during the embargo crisis of
1807-09, he details, “provided an important critique of executive
power on constitutional grounds (criticism largely absent today) and
resulted in important constraints on power and policy changes.”28
Cindy Skach provides a particularly fascinating exegesis on the
viability of eighteenth-century practices in a twenty-first-century world.
Religious diversity, she notes, is “one of the most important global
constitutional challenges in the twenty-first century.”29 Both the eighteenth and twenty-first century provide resources that may be used to
22. Kenneth Ward, The Fog of War: Checks and Balances and National Security Policy, 67
MD. L. REV. 36, 36 (2007).
23. Id. at 46–47.
24. Frances E. Lee, Geographic Representation and the U.S. Congress, 67 MD. L. REV. 51, 52
(2007).
25. Id. at 54.
26. Nackenoff, supra note 12, at 78.
27. Id.
28. Hays, supra note 11, at 202.
29. Cindy Skach, From “Just” to “Just Decent”? Constitutional Transformations and the Reordering of the Twenty-First-Century Public Sphere, 67 MD. L. REV. 258, 259 (2007).
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ameliorate or exacerbate religious conflict in the United States and
abroad. Skach finds the eighteenth-century commitment to religious
liberty a positive guide for contemporary policymaking. She regards
recent European constitutional decisions limiting rights to wear head
scarves as “a slippage, by way of constitutional law, away from liberal
constitutional democracy.”30 Those mistaken decisions, however,
prove to be rooted in a less salutary eighteenth-century constitutional
commitment, a “return to an ‘originalist’ interpretation of the European constitutional principle of public order.”31 Skach’s paper highlights how many eighteenth-century constitutions exist. Our choices
between them may be more significant than the choice between an
eighteenth-century and twenty-first-century constitution.
Some participants in the Schmooze question the value of speaking of an eighteenth-century constitution in a twenty-first-century
world. American constitutional development, they observe, has been
marked by ongoing constitutional change. The ink was hardly dry on
the document of 1789 when constitutional practices began diverging
from the constitutional text. Leslie Goldstein notes how fundamental
changes in the constitutional understanding of slavery may have taken
place as early as 1817, when a previous judicial commitment to
“giv[ing] priority to firming up the property rights of slave holders”
was transformed into a judicial commitment to giving “priority to liberty.”32 Contemporary constitutionalists often imitate Chief Justice
John Marshall’s penchant for constitutional creativity. Ronald Kahn
observes that the constitution of the twenty-first century is fashioned
by a social construction process, “a process that is far removed from
the premises and intentions that jurists and scholars have constructed
as occurring in the founding period.”33 The “Supreme Court’s legitimacy,” he maintains, is rooted in public expectations that constitutional provisions will be interpreted consistently with notions of the
living Constitution rather than remain frozen by past commitments.34
Stephen Griffin complains about the democratic costs paid by a polity
that consistently refuses to acknowledge that major constitutional
changes have taken or are taking place. “[T]he widespread view in
our constitutional culture that amendments are dangerous,” he
charges, “has operated to suppress the kind of politics that may be
30. Id. at 260.
31. Id.
32. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Slavery and the Marshall Court: Preventing “Oppressions of
the Minor Party”?, 67 MD. L. REV. 166, 167 (2007).
33. Ronald Kahn, Originalism, The Living Constitution, and Supreme Court Decision Making
in the Twenty-First Century: Explaining Lawrence v. Texas, 67 MD. L. REV. 25, 34 (2007).
34. Id.
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necessary to provide a full measure of legitimacy for government action in the post-New Deal state.”35 Rather than judge our present conditions by past standards, Griffin urges us to determine for ourselves
what goods government ought to produce and what institutional arrangements will best produce those goods.36
Whether constitutional originalism even makes sense as an interpretive strategy casts further doubt on the extent to which the
eighteenth-century Framers continue to guide the destiny of a twentyfirst-century polity. James Fleming points out that “there are numerous varieties of originalism” and they “are moving targets that have
moved considerably toward the positions of their critics.”37 The apparent convergence of constitutional theories, his Essay observes, explains why Robert Bork makes constitutional claims similar to Ronald
Dworkin when both agree that the original expectations of the Framers (as opposed to their principles) are undesirable.38 Saul Cornell
challenges the historical pretensions of much originalism. He details
how “the methods of original meaning originalism ignore many of the
most basic rules of historical inquiry” and may not be “a historically
accurate reflection of how many [Framers] would have interpreted
the Constitution.”39 Originalism as practiced, in this view, is less an
attempt to construct the present in the image of the past than an effort to reconstruct the past in the image of the future.40
No twenty-first-century constitutionalist escapes the pull of the
eighteenth century as easily as these observations might suggest.
Those Schmooze participants most committed to a living constitutionalism nevertheless recognize the complex ways in which present practices and alternatives are decisively shaped by past choices. The
constitutional changes Goldstein discusses took place at the constitutional margins, only on those matters where the constitutional text
“applied in arguably ambiguous or debatable ways.”41 When criticizing contemporary originalists, Cornell acknowledges that contemporary constitutionalists are capable of uncovering past constitutional
35. Stephen M. Griffin, Levinson and Constitutional Reform: Some Notes, 67 MD. L. REV. 14,
24 (2007).
36. Id. at 23–24.
37. James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10, 11, 12 (2007).
38. Id. at 13.
39. Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 150, 151 (2007). Readers interested in Cornell’s historical analysis of the Second Amendment should consult SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA:
THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006).
40. Cornell, supra note 39.
41. Goldstein, supra note 32, at 167.
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meanings. “[S]tandard historical methods,” he states, reveal that “the
term ‘bear arms’” in the Second Amendment “fit the military understanding of the term.”42 Originalism is, thus, not impossible, only
likely to be corrupted by present political exigencies. Fleming’s
“moral reading” of the Constitution of the United States commits constitutional interpreters to “elaborating abstract principles or values”
designated by framers in 1787, 1791, and 1868,43 rather than those
principles and values we might think best. To paraphrase his conclusion, “are we all [simultaneously] moral readers [and originalists]
now.”44
Most important, the eighteenth century continues to provide
standards for justifying, evaluating, and rebuking twenty-first-century
constitutionalism. The American antipathy to either formal constitutional change or acknowledging informal constitutional change that
Griffin condemns45 compels contemporary political leaders to claim
endorsements from James Madison and Abraham Lincoln for constitutional visions neither could even imagine, much less champion.
The legitimacy of the administrative state, the constitutional merits of
efforts to regulate the mass media and the internet, and the appropriate strategies for fighting the War on Terror must all be determined,
at least in public, partly by their consistency with eighteenth-century
metrics. The forms of constitutional reasoning further promote the
American tendency to march backwards into the future.46 “All [constitutional decision makers],” Kahn points out, “agree to follow precedent, consider polity and rights principles in making constitutional
choices, and engage in analogical reasoning.” These constitutional
logics practically compel contemporary advocates to seek George
Washington’s approval for all crucial projects that will shape the constitutional regime in the twenty-first century. Whether these practices
promote continuity with a just past or a dangerous antiquarianism is
for the reader of the following Essays to determine.
James Madison might have been disturbed that no participant in
the Symposium maintains that constitutional criticism is off-limits.
Writing as Publius, Madison insisted that even conversations about alleged constitutional failings risk serious constitutional evils. Criticiz42. Cornell, supra note 39, at 156, 162–63.
43. Fleming, supra note 37, at 13. Fleming has developed this thesis in several important books. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(2007); JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2006).
44. Fleming, supra note 37, at 13.
45. See Griffin, supra note 35, at 22-24.
46. See QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 149-50 (2002) (noting that “[a]ll revolutionaries are . . . obliged to march backwards into battle”).
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ing Jefferson’s call for repeated constitutional conventions, he stated,
“frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the government
of that veneration which time bestows on everything.”47 The spirit of
Federalist No. 49 would condemn our debates over the merits of the
Constitution for insufficiently appreciating the “danger of disturbing
the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions”48 and threatening “the constitutional equilibrium of the government.”49 “[T]he most rational government,” Madison maintained,
“will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the
community on its side.”50
All the following papers are Jeffersonian in that none “look at
constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the
ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched.”51 None “ascribe to the
[Framers] . . . a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did
to be beyond amendment.”52 Both Levinson and his critics agree that
“[e]ach generation . . . has . . . a right to choose for itself the form of
government it believes most promotive of its own happiness.”53 The
dispute is over the extent to which the Constitution of 1787, as modified in 1868, is that “form of government.”54

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 674 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
1944).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 675.
54. Id.

